Introduction
In recent years there has been a noticeable increase in the use of the concept of "trust" in the management literature. There have been discussions of what "trust" is; what the phrase "to trust" means; attempts to differentiate between "trust" and associated terms such as "confidence"; "reliability"; and, consideration of the factors which need to be present if trust is to be possible; etc. Much of the literature in which these discussions is to be found has been in the organisational behaviour field and has primarily been concerned with issues related to trust within organisations.
There has also been a growing use of the concept of trust in papers concerned with business to business relationships. Such studies have been supportive of the view that there are benefits in moving away from adversarial supplier-customer relationships to those where there is a more co-operative and mutually supportive approach. Although some empirical studies (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1990; Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Anderson et al., 1987; Bialaszewski and Giallourakis, 1985; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994a; Moorman et al., 1992; Schurr and Ozanne, 1985) have identified the importance of "trust" in inter-organisational relationships, the few which have gone on to offer "managerial implications" have mostly provided rather general statements such as: "if managers hope to build co-operative relationships with their business partners, they must first work to establish commitment and trust." (Morgan and Hunt, 1994b) . Such general statements inevitably are of rather limited value in terms of recommending specific action. For example, even if it is theoretically possible to create "trust"(and many writers would deny that it can be (e.g. Elster, 1983; Luhman, 1979; Sako, 1994) ), how can Morgan and Hunt's proposal be implemented?
However it is possible that examining a managerial situation from a "trust" perspective may provide new insights to management opportunities, challenges and threats. The following is therefore a comparison of an interpretation of a well-known case study from a trust based view with that of the more traditional power based point of view. The aim being to make a qualitative assessment of the added "added value" that such an approach gives to the power based interpretation of the case that is proposed in the teaching note issued with the case.
What is "trust"?
Philosophers when discussing "trust" frequently refer to the party which displays trust in another as making themselves vulnerable to the other party's behaviour. In other words if you trust somebody then you accepted that while it is a theoretical possibility it is not a realistic probability that they will act in a manner which would disadvantage you. Views of the nature of this vulnerability vary with, for example, Baier's being that "Trust then … is accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) towards one" (Baier, 1986) . However Govier takes a significantly different view because, while recognising that trusting involves making oneself vulnerable, she asserts that there is a significant positive aspect to it as well and states that trust involves "expectations of benign action and acceptance of vulnerability" (Govier, 1994) . That is trust involves the expectation, not just of a lack of ill-will, but an element of goodwill from the person trusted.
In other words to trust somebody with whom you have some form of contact means that, although you recognise that the other person has the capability of acting in a manner which could harm you, you do not believe that it is necessary to take action to safeguard yourself against such possible acts. Furthermore you would not be surprised if such a person acts in a manner which benefits youeven though that action might not be formally required of them.
The lack of conscious trust
The decision not to safeguard one's interests might initially be a conscious one but may evolve into an "unconscious" one in the sense of becoming habitual as indeed might the expectancy of the other's goodwill. Indeed the greater part of our lives does not involve conscious trust for "(t)rust merges gradually into expectations of continuity which are formed as the firm guidelines by which we conduct our everyday lives" (Luhman, 1979) and dealing with an organisation with a good reputation encourages this movement from explicit trust to a habitual and confident state of lack of conscious trust. This is an attractive state for a customer to be in with regard to a supplier as "(h)abit, by allowing predictable events or features of event to be managed with hardly any effort, enables people to concentrate most of their attention on the unpredictable" (Young, 1988) . Nevertheless, the crossing of a boundary or threshold can transform this passive expectation of continuity into conscious trust or conscious distrust. So if a supplier lets us down we may, while being disappointed, accept their explanation and continue our relationship as before. However, there will be a certain point (perhaps connected with the frequency or seriousness of the "letting down") where such behaviour will trigger a loss of trust and even the beginning of a distrustful relationship.
It follows that once a supplier has agreed to do business with a customer whose reputation they have evaluated then most of those activities which together constitute the transaction are not evaluated in detail. Supplies are delivered and the supplier has confidence that payment will be received; a cheque arrives and the supplier has confidence that it will be honoured and will assume that this will be the case in managing its cash-flow; and so on. In this sense the greater part of the relationship is habitual. What a supplier will have in place of course is a system which flags any significant variation in the customer's behaviour and should this happen it can then make a conscious decision as to whether or not to trust the customer.
The Charlestown Chemical Case -a summary
Charlestown Chemical and Puritan Chemical[1] had been buying and selling a variety of commodity chemicals from each other for several years. By 1985 Puritan, the larger company, was purchasing 50 per cent more from Charlestown than vice versa. One of the chemicals that Charlestown purchased from Puritan was muriatic acid which, because it was used in a production process, required very low levels of impurities. Because of this Charlestown's chemists did not like accepting a supply of the acid if it had been created as a by-product of another process.
On the 15 June 1985 Puritan informed Mr Todd (Charlestown's purchasing director) by fax that on 1 July muriatic acid's price would rise from $97.50 to $132.50 per ton. The 15 days notice of the increase was the minimum allowed by the contract for the supply of the acid. The contract stated that Charlestown had to accept any price change unless it produced evidence that it had obtained a lower price from another "responsible manufacturer" and Puritan failed to match that price. The contract further stipulated that Charlestown would purchase its entire muriatic acid requirements from Puritan but that purchases could not exceed 4,000 tons per year without Puritan's agreement.
Because he was aware that the national demand for muriatic acid was increasing Todd had been expecting Puritan to raise its price by about $10-15 per ton. However he both found the size of the proposed increase excessive and the manner of its announcement unacceptable and informed Puritan of his views. Initially Puritan refused to negotiate and so, knowing of no other potential supplier of muriatic acid within an economic delivery distance of Charlestown's plant, Todd approached a jobber, Lee, that had previously solicited for a share of the business.
Initially Lee offered to supply not less than 3,000 and not more than 3,500 tons of muriatic acid at a price of $111 but would not disclose the source of the acid. On 22 June Todd met Puritan and stated that he had an attractive competitive offer for his muriatic acid requirements but refused to release any further information. Puritan's initial position was that its own action had been strictly within the contract's terms and conditions which, they stressed, called for them to supply Charlestown's entire muriatic acid requirement. Puritan also commented that, if Todd continued to consider an alternative supply for muriatic acid, the whole Puritan/Charlestown relationship might need to be re-examined.
Todd then arranged to test a sample of Lee's muriatic acid but on 1 July, before the test's results were known, Puritan announced that it would maintain supplies at $97.50 but reemphasised the "entire supply" element of the contract.
Todd felt that, without Lee's involvement, he would have been unable to challenge Puritan and he therefore waited until the results of the tests on Lee's sample were known before responding. Although these proved satisfactory, before Todd could decide what to do, Lee re-iterated the price offer $102.50 but removed the requirement to purchase at least 3,000 tons. Puritan also approached him about this time stating that, in view of the tightening supply situation, they wished to sign a contract for 1986 at $97.50 on an "entire requirements" basis. They also announced that they would be purchasing several commodity chemicals not previously purchased from Charlestown worth an additional $500,000.
The case itself does not disclose how Todd finally placed his contract or consequently the reaction of Puritan and Lee to Todd's actionthis is only revealed in the teaching note. However, in November Todd offered Lee a contract to supply 2,000 at $97.50. Lee accepted. Todd then offered Puritan a contract for 3,000 tons (stressing this was a part requirement) at $97.50. Puritan accepted but its vice president (sales) wrote to Todd saying "I congratulate you on your successful negotiations for your muriatic acid requirements for 1986. I hope that negotiations on other products will evolve more favourably for Puritan."
The case teaching note goes on to make it clear that its author believed that business to business relationships are essentially power relationships. For example, all of the six questions it suggests should be used as a basis of the case discussion relate to the issue of the relative power positions of Puritan and Charlestown before and after Puritan's announcement on 15 June and how subsequent changes in those power positions were achieved. Furthermore, the note goes on to comment that "in many ways the buying/selling relationship is a power relationship, and this case basically deals with ways in which a purchasing manager develops and uses power". Factors which enabled Todd to develop and subsequently use power over Puritan are then suggested and finally it is implied that Todd "wins" the confrontation with Puritan. The Note accords Lee very little attention though it is suggested that it "rescued" Todd and so, in one sense, Charlestown "owes" Lee some business.
Obviously most cases can be used for more than one purpose but the teaching note's concentration, to the exclusion of any other viewpoint, on the role of power is striking. Indeed such an approach would seem to be at odds with the current view (e.g. Morgan and Hunt, 1994a) that trust is the best basis on which to build relationships which are both efficient and effective. The following section will therefore examine the Case from a "trust perspective" to see if additional insights are obtained from such an approach.
A trust based interpretation
Within this case at least three lines of action can be identified. These are not mutually independent and many but not all of the actions discussed are clearly responses to initiatives taken by other parties. However, initially neither the interplay of the decisions that are made or actions taken will be discussed, rather the development of the situation will be observed from the point of view of one party at a time.
Puritan
The case suggests that a long-standing and complex relationship had existed between Puritan and Charlestown. Nothing in detail is known of the history of the relationship but it appears to have reached a stage where a habitual and confident state of lack of conscious trust existed -a state which is disrupted by Puritan's announcement of the price increase.
Three aspects of Puritan's action irritate Todd. First, he believes that the announced increase is excessively large. Second, the form of the announcement offends him. Third, Puritan announced the increase at the latest possible date within the terms of the contract.
Any of these factors would have led Todd to question the nature of Charlestown's relationship with Puritan. Indeed each one falls well beyond those with which Govier suggests a trusting relationship can cope when she states "(t)rusting another person, one is inclined to understand what he does and says in positive terms; for example, one is unlikely … to see minor instances of unreliability as such as lateness or a missed appointment that the other person does not care or is breaking promises" (Govier, 1994) . Indeed, from Todd's response it is apparent that they fall outside the range of behaviour that he regards as appropriate from a trusted partner and Puritan can be regarded as having crossed a crucial threshold for its action contradicts Todd's expectation that Puritan will behave "properly or adequately in all circumstances" (Misztal, 1996) .
Although a one-off breach of trust may be forgiven, refusal to apologise for the action or worse asserting that the action was justified can lead to a permanent breakdown in the trust relationship. So Puritan's action in initially refusing to allow Todd to start negotiations about the proposed price increase and their contractual approach to the discussion when they eventually met Todd almost seems designed to indicate a changed relationship. Puritan's behaviour at this stage is more characteristic of an organisation involved in a discrete exchange than in a relationship exchange. Indeed, Macneil (1980) suggests that the use of formal rules in resolving conflicts is not a characteristic of relationship exchanges but is characteristic of a situation where at least one of the parties to the exchange no longer feels that the future value of the exchange outweighs the cost of the current conflict. Finally Puritan hinted that, should Todd continue to consider alternative sources of supply for muriatic acid, this might affect the whole Puritan/ Charlestown relationship. Such a hint can at best be considered as an attempt, given that Puritan purchases from Charlestown exceeded it sales to Charlestown by $3.45 million, to remind Charlestown of its power over it.
Any one of these actions would be contrary to that which would be expected within an established relationship. Together they seem to signify a move if not to an adversarial type of exchange, away from a trust relationship.
Following the 22 June meeting Puritan's actions indicate a desire to re-establish relations with Charlestown. First they rescinded the price increase and then they also substantially increased the purchases that they were making from Charlestown but still maintained that the contract was for Charlestown's entire muriatic acid needs. However, their final acceptance of Todd's terms, which removed their sole supplier status, together with the tone of their vice-president (sales) letter to Todd, would seem to show a wish to get the relationship back to the state it was in before 15 June.
Lee
It appears that, although Lee has approached him in the past, Todd has not previously dealt with Lee. There is no evidence that Todd has any particular view of Lee's reputation and so it must be presumed that Lee's reputation will be that of jobbers in general. This means that, at least initially, Todd's attitude towards Lee is unlikely to be one of trust. The reason for this being that large purchasers only use jobbers to obtain supplies when there is some sort of unexpected demand with which their regular suppliers cannot help (Blois, 1996) . A jobber's role is to buy excess supplies and sell them where shortages have arisen -fundamentally providing an arbitrage function. Because of this managers in large organisations often tend to "look down" on brokers, regarding them as a sort of scavenger and generally viewing them as rather "sharp operators". This view is supported by brokers' refusal to disclose the source of their material to their customers or its destination to those from whom they purchase.
If Dasgupta is correct in stating that you trust a person (or an agency) to do something "only because, knowing what you know of his disposition, his available options and their consequences, his ability and so forth, you expect that he will choose to do it" (Dasgupta, 1988, p. 50 ) then it is not surprising that brokers like Lee find that their customers and suppliers sometimes treat them with caution. For a broker's organisation, management style and method of making profits is not obviously compatible with stable trust based relationships and while firms like Puritan and Charlestown are glad that jobbers exist they are happy that under normal circumstances they do not have to use them. The reputation of brokers in general would, until he has contrary evidence, thus lead Todd to expect Lee to exploit problems arising from shortages.
Even though the quality checks on a sample indicate that the acid was acceptable to the Charlestown plant managers, Todd's major concern about buying from Lee remains the quality of the acid. For while Lee has established that it has access to some muriatic acid of the required quality Todd must, if he is to place a contract with Lee, trust Lee to continue to supply at that level of quality.
Trusting Lee is clearly a risk for "rather than being just an inference from the past, trust goes beyond the information it receives and risks defining the future. The complexity of the future world is reduced by the act of trust. In trusting, one engages in action as though there were only certain possibilities in the future" (Luhman, 1979) . Todd is therefore apparently willing to envisage "possibilities in the future" which do not include Lee behaving like a typical broker.
Lee's initial position is that it has identified an opportunity to buy muriatic acid but probably on condition that it takes a defined quantity. Its preferred position is thus to avoid breaking bulk and to sell the quantity purchased as one lot. Therefore Lee's willingness to drop the requirement that Charlestown purchase at least 3,000 tons exposes it to the risk of being left with small quantities of the acid unsold. Dropping the requirement may therefore be a significant indication that it is genuinely anxious to become one of Charlestown's regular suppliers.
However, if Lee wishes to enable Todd to trust it then it should recognise that "one's trust turns not on one's own interests but on the interests of the trusted. It is encapsulated in one's judgement of those interests" (Hardin, 1993) . So if it is intent on building a trust relationship with him, Lee needs to try to perceive what Todd would take as evidence that it has an interest in being seen as trustworthy. This implies that if Lee wishes to be trusted by Todd then it will have to somehow show that, at least with regard to Charlestown, it will not behave like a typical broker. context of this case an effective step might be for Lee to disclose the source of the acid. Such an action would demonstrate that Lee trusts Charlestown to continue to purchase from it and not to by-pass it by approaching Lee's source direct.
Charlestown/Todd
Todd's reaction to Puritan's announcement of the increase in price together with the timing and the form that the announcement takes is anger which is based on a mixture of wounded personal and professional pride. Personal in that the form of the communication was rather abrupt. Professional because the price increase far exceeded what he had expected and may have led him to question his own judgement. Also the late announcement would possibly cause him to look foolish inside Charlestown because of the need to rapidly adjust cost schedules in response to the new raw material price.
Throughout the case Todd acts entirely on his own responsibility and apparently without clearance from his superiors. He admits that the contract was "ambiguous and open to different interpretations" but takes the view that within a long-term relationship "the ties are frequently quite closely knit so that the fine print on contract forms is not too important". Thus implying that Puritan's action in talking in terms of the detail of the contract is incompatible with his perception of a trusting relationship and that this is further evidence of Puritan's destruction of the relationship. However, whatever the legal correctness of Todd's position, Puritan feels his interpretation of the contract as unreasonable.
Todd's final manoeuvre of accepting both Puritan's and Lee's prices but ignoring the terms attached to them is very risky and was presumably interpreted by both of these suppliers as a rather high-handed action. Todd therefore will possibly now be seen as a "sharp player" who argues that the fine print should not be referred to while simultaneously acting in manner which demonstrates the need both for fine print and for careful monitoring of its interpretation! His action in interpreting the contract with Puritan in this way signals to Puritan that, from his point of view, the relationship has been damaged by its behaviour. Indeed that as a result of their actions he now feels free to behave in a manner which he previously felt was precluded because a trust based relationship existed between the two companies. His action in accepting Lee's price, but ignoring the associated conditions, also sends a signal to Lee that at this stage he is taking an adversarial approach to the relationship.
Cost consequences
The actions and reactions that followed Puritan's announcement of the price increase have many consequences. The overall impact though is that Puritan and Charlestown incur a variety of new costs and some of these costs are likely to have long-term effects.
Puritan at the end of the incident has failed to obtain a price increase for muriatic acid for the period from July 1985 through 1986 -even though the market price appears to be rising. While it had been selling 4,000 tons at $97.50 per ton Puritan is now selling only 3,000 at $97.50 when, as Todd had been expecting to pay between $10-15 more per tonne, it could have been selling 4,000 tonnes at between $107.50 and $112.50 per ton. This represents a loss of between $40,000 and $60,000 in revenue! In addition Puritan has committed itself to purchase an additional $500,000 of chemicals from Charlestown. Even if it makes these purchases at the price it is currently paying its existing suppliers, Puritan will inevitably incur some additional costs as a result of the need to change its relationships with its existing suppliers.
There is also the cost of Puritan's management time in dealing with what became a complex and contentious matter instead of an issue which could have probably involved a single discussion with Todd. Indeed the involvement at the end of the "negotiations" of Puritan's vice-president (sales) indicates that, a matter that might have been routinely dealt with by junior managers, has taken the time of senior officials before it could be resolved. This is in contrast with the situation where trust exists when, while there is no right to expect the trusted person or organisation to "eliminate self-interest" (Hosmer, 1995) , it can be anticipated that they will take our legitimate interests into account and so a customer can operate almost by habit or routinely with regard to a supplier and vice versa. In this case, Puritan's action crossed a boundary or threshold and transformed Charlestown's passive expectation of continuity into conscious distrust and more careful monitoring of the relationship.
A final cost to Puritan is the damage to its reputation if its actions had become known to its other customers. The manner in which the original 25 per cent price increase was demanded would alone have been damaging to its reputation. However the subsequent way in which the increase was retracted would also send signals to the other Puritan customers regarding the possibility of challenging Puritan on price.
Initially Todd appears to have come out of the situation rather well. He has avoided paying a higher price even though market conditions justified an increase. Furthermore he now has two suppliers where before he was restricted to one. However, there are new costs for him as well. First Todd and other managers have spent time and energy negotiating with Puritan and Lee and checking Lee's quality. As muriatic acid only represents 4 per cent of Charlestown's purchases, if the proposed price increase had been in the expected region of $10-15, it is arguable that Todd (who was Charlestown's director of purchasing) would not have been much involved in the negotiations. A further cost is that Puritan will in future be watching all negotiations with Todd rather more carefully for he has displayed an aggressiveness and a willingness to interpret contracts in a manner which has obviously taken them by surprise. Indeed the letter from Puritan's vicepresident (sales) could imply that there is a "score to be settled" and that in future, when either making purchases from or negotiating sales to Charlestown, Puritan will be watching carefully to ensure that it does not come out at a disadvantage again. It may also be that Todd's behaviour will have become known to others of Charlestown's suppliers and that they too will become more cautious in their dealings with him.
The "trust" interpretation compared with the teaching note's approach
The most noticeable difference between the power and the trust interpretation of this case is that under the power interpretation Todd is seen to clearly "win". By way of contrast the trust interpretation shows that both Puritan and Charlestown are worse off than if the increase had been handled in a manner more appropriate to a trust based relationship. Indeed the only winner would appear to be Lee which achieves its ambition of becoming one of Charlestown's recognised suppliers -a matter about which the power interpretation does not comment.
The trust interpretation by identifying the additional costs that both parties incur, once Puritan's behaviour leads Todd to question its trustworthiness, draws attention to the benefits which arise when trust, or at least the lack of conscious distrust, exists in a relationship. Given that "Trust is much easier to maintain than to get started and is never hard to destroy" (Baier, 1986) , the additional costs (especially the management costs) which arise when trust is destroyed are likely to be incurred for some time.
A second difference is that only the trust approach identifies the difficulties (and therefore the costs and risks) that a potential business partner, such as Lee, faces in establishing its trustworthiness. The recognition that Lee needs to establish its "trustworthiness" in terms which are acceptable to the trustor (i.e. Todd) is also important. Todd has incurred considerable costs in evaluating Lee and, until he feels that he can indeed fully trust Lee, Todd will face on-going risks with their associated costs. If Lee can understand these costs then it may see ways in which it can establish itself as a trustworthy supplier in Todd's eyes.
Conclusion
It has been suggested that examining developments within a business to business relationship from a trust point of view is of value because it provides additional insights to those gained if only on a power perspective is used. The trust perspective leads to a different interpretation of both the dynamics involved; the costs incurred when a trust relationship is damaged; and, the costs incurred in building up a new trust relationship. The costs identified as consequence of the loss of trust being evidence of the benefits that might have been gained if the trusting relationship had continued when, because of the existence of trust, the costs of transacting would at least have been reduced.
Note

